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Robert Lawrence reviews once again an issue which has been
much debated throughout the 1980's. He asks whether Japan,
either by government action or by the private exercise of market
power, interferes with the access of foreign products and/or
foreign firms to its domestic markets.
Lawrence makes a special effort to emphasize the distinction
between access to the Japanese market for foreign products and
access for foreign firms. Foreign firms may have access to the
Japanese market, but they might exploit this access by marketing
goods produced largely in Japan. Alternatively, foreign goods
may gain access to Japan as the by-product of intra-firm
transactions between Japan and its overseas affiliates without
foreign firms necessarily having access at all. Lawrence argues
persuasively which type of access foreigners have to the Japanese
market has important implications for the economic welfare and
income distribution of both Japan and its trading partners.
Japanese trade is distinctive, Lawrence finds, because
exports to Japan have generally been shipped by foreign
affiliates of Japanese firms. Whereas international vertical
integration generally proceeds forward from producers to markets,
in Japan it appears to proceed backwards from control of markets
to sources of supply.
Lawrence thinks that this distinctive pattern of backward
vertical integration in turn may be responsible for Japan's
distinctively meager participation in intra-industry trade.
Foreign firms are much more likely to produce new varieties of
goods already manufactured in Japan. Domestic firms are less
likely, however, to import products which compete directly with
those they (or their associates) manufacture at home. Intra-firm
shipments by domestic firms are thus less likely to result in the
importation of new varieties produced abroad. Since intra-
industry trade exists in considerable measure because of
preference for variety, if imports are dominated by domestically-
based intra-firm transactions it may not be very surprising at
all that Japan's level of intra-industry trade is low.
In Japan, vertical integration not only moves distinctively
backward from sales in domestic markets to foreign suppliers, it
also proceeds forward from domestic producers to sales to users
in overseas markets. Like Japanese imports, Lawrence finds that
Japanese exports are also heavily dominated by intra-firm
transactions. Japanese firms serve foreign markets by selling to
their overseas subsidiaries. Such evidence, Lawrence notes, is
consistent with well-known survey results by Mordechai Kreinin,
which find that Japanese overseas subsidiaries, unlike other
foreign subsidiaries, have an unusually strong preference to
source their supplies from their home market.
It is not just that foreign firms play a distinctively small
role in Japan's international trade. Lawrence also believes that
foreign products have a distinctively low share of Japan's
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domestic market. To be sure, there are quite a number of
extensive studies of Japan's trade structure which reach
different conclusions. Citing a paper by Koichi Hamada and T. N.
Srinavasan, however, Lawrence finds such econometric evidence to
be inconclusive on whether, after allowance is made for Japan's
distinctive national endowments, particularly its lack of natural
resources, there is really anything distinctive about Japan's
trade structure.
Lawrence prefers to look directly at cross-national price
differences to uncover whether or not foreign products' access to
the Japanese market is restricted. While it is often difficult
to assemble comparable price data cross countries, Lawrence feels
enough evidence is available to conclude that there are large and
persistent price differences between Japan and other countries
that cannot be accounted for by higher distribution margins or
real estate costs. He concludes that Japanese manufacturers are
able to charge higher prices for the goods they sell in Japan
than for the goods they sell in the rest of the world. In
consequence, Lawrence notes it is not surprising that the profits
of Japanese manufacturers as a proportion of value-added are
unduly large by international standards. Potential arbitrage
opportunities between the Japanese market and the rest of the
world cannot be fully exploited.
While Lawrence finds considerable evidence that leads him to
conclude that Japanese markets are not genuinely contestable by
foreign products or foreign firms, he appears to be impressed by
the capacity for change within the Japanese economy. He finds
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that many of the barriers to the Japanese market operate like
tariffs rather than quotas. They keep imported products
expensive in Japan, but they do not prevent marginal responses to
price and cost incentives. The exchange rate changes in the mid
1980's have resulted in a dramatic increase in the total volume
of manufactured goods imported into Japan over the past four
years. At a sectoral level where tangible barriers have been
removed as a result of negotiations, significant increases in
imports have resulted. Given the major shifts in Japanese
behavior which have taken place over the past few years, Lawrence
finds it surprising that some Americans feel so exasperated as to
advocate an entirely new approach to dealing with U.S.-Japan
economic relations.
Intra-Firm Transactions
While Lawrence's analysis, as always, is full of good
insight and highly plausible, it is possible to disagree both
with some of the inferences he draws from the evidence he has
assembled and indeed with some of the evidence itself. While an
unusually large share of Japanese imports are the result of
intra-firm transactions, it is not at all clear that these
transactions represent backward vertical integration in the way
that term is normally understood. These intra-firm transactions,
by and large, are neither the purchases of Japanese manufacturing
firms, nor of Japan retailers, nor the sale of goods produced by
their overseas subsidiaries and affiliates. While this may
change in the 1990's, by comparison with firms in other major
industrialized countries, firms with established positions in the
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Japanese market have only rarely found it profitable to integrate
backwards into production entities abroad. In 1987 only 5.3% of
Japanese imports were intra-firm transactions of goods produced
by Japanese entities abroad. By contrast, for the United States
in 1987, no less than 18.4% of all imports were the result of
intra-firm transactions of goods produced abroad by American
subsidiaries and affiliates. 1
Intra-firm transactions dominate Japanese imports only
because Japanese importers are taking title to their goods abroad
rather than when they reach Japanese ports. That Japanese
importers happen to take title to their goods via separately
incorporated subsidiaries in Los Angeles rather than directly in
Yokohama, by itself, is not very significant at all. While
issues may remain about the volume and composition of Japanese
imports, a distinctively high proportion of the imports which do
reach the Japanese market are produced by foreign-owned firms.
Japanese keiretsu
Intra-firm transactions play such a large role in Japan's
foreign trade because of Japan's giant general trading companies.
In 1986, Japan's nine largest trading companies handled 66% of
all Japanese imports. Is it possible that Japanese trading
companies restrict what they import, not so much to protect their
own domestic production, of which they do little, but rather to
protect the interests of other firms to which they are tied
through their keiretsu affiliation? In considering this
possibility, it is important to keep some perspective on the
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strength of keiretsu ties. Japan has many keiretsu of one type
or another, but currently the six best known are Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-Ichi and Sanwa. Mitsui,
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo are directly descended from the pre-war
zaibatsu which SCAP (Supreme Command of the Allied Powers) tried
to break up during the American Occupation of Japan. By
contrast, the Fuyo, Dai Ichi Kangyo and Sanwa keiretsu, have been
formed largely in the years after 1945. Members of all these six
keiretsu are much less closely tied than is generally realized.
The member firms in keiretsu with strong pre-war roots purchase
only 14.8% of their procurement from fellow keiretsu members.
For the more recently organized keiretsu procurement from fellow
keiretsu members is still less important. Only 8.9% of
procurement is purchased from affiliated firms. 2
While reciprocal purchasing seems to be too weak to tie
keiretsu together, it is often suggested that cross-shareholding
among member firms does allow the keiretsu as a whole effective
control over any individual member firm. In fact, cross-
shareholding is not nearly as pervasive nor so exclusive among
keiretsu members as is commonly believed. Among the six best-
known keiretsu, the average of a member firm's equity held by all
other members of its keiretsu is 17.9%.3 While this is a
relatively small amount of cross-holding, if ownership of the
firm's remaining equity is widely dispersed, even this amount may
be sufficient to give the keiretsu control of the member firm.
In fact, for the typical member firm, control of the remaining
equity is not particularly dispersed at all. Large blocks of
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equity are often held by members of rival keiretsu. 4  Such
holdings, if exercised in concert, are quite often sufficient to
block effective keiretsu control of member firms.
Ties among keiretsu firms are sufficiently weak that it is
not uncommon for Japanese firms to move from one keiretsu to
another. Between 1972 and 1983, over one quarter of the
companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
changed their keiretsu membership. 5  This weakening of keiretsu
ties goes hand in hand with the declining dependence of large
Japanese firms on keiretsu banks. In 1974 Japanese firms,
capitalized at more than one billion yen, relied on banks for
46.7% of their new financing. Just ten years later no more than
2.6% of new investment by these large Japanese firms was financed
by bank borrowing. 6
If keiretsu commercial and financial ties are relatively
weak and if such ties have been made still weaker by financial
deregulation, it is hard to believe that Japan's distinctive
trade structure can be explained by Japan's trading companies
exercising what market power they have protecting their fellow
keiretsu members from competitive imports. As noted, Lawrence
does cite Mordechai Kreinin's case study of foreign investment in
Australia as persuasive evidence in suppport of the
discriminatory purchasing of goods and services by Japanese
companies. Unfortunately, not only does Kreinin's study not
square with what is known about keiretsu behavior in the 1980's,
it doesn't square with Lawrence's own study of Japanese foreign
investment in the U.S. In this study Lawrence notes 7
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Although it is widely perceived that Japanese-
affiliated automakers depend overwhelmingly on parts
bought from Japanese-affiliated suppliers, a detailed
GAO survey calls this perception into question. It
found, for example, that of the 119 US-based suppliers
used by Honda, only 28 had Japanese affiliations.
Similarly 15 of Nissan's 121 suppliers were Japanese-
affiliated and 8 of the 60 suppliers used by Toyota
were Japanese affiliated.
Not only does Lawrence find, contrary to Kreinin, that
Japanese firms do not rely primarily on Japanese suppliers, he
also finds, again contrary to Kreinin, that 1) value-added by
Japanese firms in the U.S. is high; 2) Japanese firms do
considerable research and development and design work in the
U.S., and 3) Japanese firms rely heavily on American managers.
In general, findings such as Kreinin's can be explained on
grounds that have little to do with discriminatory or restrictive
practices by Japanese firms and groups. Most Japanese
manufacturing investment in Australia is of quite recent origin.
It is designed to produce substitutes for products which were
until very recently exported (and indeed continue to be exported)
to Australia from Japan. Japan continues to retain (or until
recently retained) a comparative advantage in most of what it is
producing in Australia. Japanese manufacturing in Australia is
an effort to put more value-added into the Australian economy,
but Japanese ability to maintain and expand its market position
there more likely rests on what it imports from home. By
contrast, much of the European and American direct investments in
Australia with which Kreinin compares Japanese practices were
made a decade or more (in some instances six or seven decades)
ago. While originally substitutes for exports, many of these
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investments are in product lines where the home country of the
firm making the investment has long since lost much of its
comparative advantage. It is hardly surprising that, unlike the
Australian subsidiaries of Japanese firms, the Australian
subsidiaries of European and American firms should have to source
broadly in order to retain their local market share.
Kreinin's findings for Australia are entirely consistent
with the traditional histories of multinational corporations and
overseas direct investment and do not suggest truly distinctive
Japanese practices. 8  The early history of Ford and GM, among
other American enterprises in Japan, is hardly different from the
Japanese experience. More generally, this issue comes up so
often in the experience of so many firms and host countries, that
it is hardly surprising that there are hundreds of local content
laws on national statute books throughout the world. The
Japanese behavior in Australia is the commonplace behavior of
firms from all countries in host countries throughout the world.
Econometric Studies on Japanese Trade Volume and Trade Structure
If keiretsu ties are weaker and if Japanese firm procurement
behavior appears to be far less discriminatory than is generally
supposed, it may not be so surprising to find that there are now
quite a few econometric studies (including a number by me), which
show, after allowance is made for Japan's distinctive national
endowments, particularly its lack of natural resources, there is
relatively little that is really distinctive about Japan's trade
structure. While it is certainly true that there are studies
(including one by Lawrence himself) which come up with contrary
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findings, it is not entirely fair to argue that since some
econometric issues can be raised about all of these studies, they
should all be discounted. Some econometric issues are more
important than others. The Srinavasan and Hamada survey, which
Lawrence cites, certainly does not view all these studies as
equally flawed. After noting that 9
except for the study by Leamer [which like my study is
dubious about the extent of Japanese under-importing]
and arguably by Saxonhouse, the others are subject to a
number of estimation biases
they conclude
The empirical support in favor or against the
hypothesis that Japanese are underimporting is subject
to criticisms which are most damaging particularly to
studies in favor of the hypothesis.
Lawrence may find this conclusion surprising but only
because he may be mis-interpreting the Srinavasan and Hamada
comments on my work. While Srinavasan and Hamada are uneasy
about my cavalierly assuming away the consequences of leaving
out, because of the unavailability of data, those factor
endowments which would allow my Heckscher-Ohlin specification to
have the same number of goods as factors (Leamer also assumes
away this problem), they reserve most of their attention to my
use of forecast intervals. Their comments are well taken. It is
clear I should be using tolerance intervals rather than forecast
intervals when conducting my tests on the distinctiveness of
Japanese trade behavior. Given my findings, however, my failure
to use tolerance intervals should make no difference at all.
Except for the case when the sample size is infinite, for any
given probability, the forecast interval will always be smaller
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than the tolerance interval.10  Since I find Japan to fall within
the forecast interval, it will also fall within the tolerance
interval. In neither case will Japan be the outlier.
Price Differentials
While weak keiretsu ties make studies which find little
evidence of Japanese underimporting all the more plausible, as
Lawrence notes, if there are persistent price differentials
between Japan and other countries for comparable products the
credibility of such studies is weakened. It has long been
appreciated that cross-national price differentials are a good
way to measure the impact of non-tariff barriers. 1 1 Unhappily,
the absence of strictly comparable cross-national price data has
made it difficult to use this approach.
For example, during the past year, much has been made of the
so-called "Forty-Seventh Street Photo Phenomenon," which claims
that Japanese products, in general, and cameras, in particular,
are sold abroad at lower prices than at home. 1 2  Many Japanese
government officials have vehemently rejected this claim arguing
that the products being priced cross-nationally are simply not
comparable. For example, they argue that Forty-Seventh Street
Photo charges low prices only because it is selling older models
of cameras no longer desired by the Japanese consumer. This
controversy bubbled over in the U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments
Initiative discussions last Fall. As an outcome of this
controversy the U.S. Department of Commerce and Japan's Ministry
of International Trade and Industry agreed to undertake a
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detailed joint price survey which would take special pains to
price comparable products in the United States and Japan.
The survey actually conducted appears to have been
scrupulous in its efforts to obtain comparable retail price data.
Considerable effort has been extended to insure that comparable
products are being priced in comparable retail locations. Price
observations have been segregated according to whether they have
been taken in specialty shops, discount houses or department
stores. Unfortunately, the products included in this survey are
in no sense a random sample of the universe of comparable
products available in U.S. and Japanese markets. Rather they are
the outcome of weeks of acrimonious negotiation between Commerce
and MITI. Indeed, the final list could not be agreed upon until
the day before the survey started.
The actual survey results contain some surprises. While
there are certainly many instances of Japanese goods having lower
prices in the U.S. than in Japan, the "Forty-Seventh Street
Photo" phenomenon is not pervasive even at Forty-Seventh Street
Photo. Of fourteen Japanese-produced cameras and video camera
related products, only six are cheaper in the United States.
Overall, twenty-six of fifty-seven Japanese products have been
found to be cheaper in the United States than in Japan. By
striking contrast, only four of thirty-five U.S. products and
only two of twenty-one European products are cheaper in Japan
than in the United States. 1 3
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Simply counting up observations of what, in any event, is
not a randomly drawn sample may yield a very misleading
impression. Bill Cline of the Institute for International
Economics has analyzed the determinants of the U.S. and Japanese
price differences found in this sample.14  Cline rejects the
"Forty-Seventh Street Photo" phenomenon and finds that there is
no statistically significant difference between U.S. and Japanese
retail prices for goods produced in Japan. By contrast, the
hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference
between U.S. and Japanese retail prices for goods produced in the
United States and Europe cannot be accepted.
Cline's results present a problem for those who would argue
that the Japanese market for manufactured products is highly
protected. If the Japanese market is highly protected, both
Japanese and foreign products should have much higher prices in
Japan than abroad. That only foreign products have high prices
in Japan suggests a different interpretation. The high prices
for U.S. and European products in Japan may reflect the marketing
strategies of oligopolistic firms. As Cline notes, US and
European firms appear to have concluded that they can maximize
profits in the Japanese market through a low-volume high-price
strategy.
For Cline's interpretation to be persuasive it must be
possible that, even in the absence of trade barriers, US and
European firms can successfully maintain price differentials in
excess of transport costs. Such behavior is plausible. For
example, if 1) the demands for many of these products are
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relatively price inelastic and 2) there are fixed costs in the
arbitrage of the kinds of differentiated final products examined
in the Commerce-MITI Price Survey, (perhaps because of economies
of scale in transportation) then new entry will be anemic and
substantial price differentials can persist.
The absence of statistically significant differences in
prices in U.S. and Japanese markets for Japanese products is
largely consistent with Lawrence's finding that both distribution
margins and the cost of distribution as a proportion of final
goods prices are more or less the same in both Japan and the U.S.
It may not be consistent, however, with Lawrence's findings that
capital invested in Japanese manufacturing earns a uniquely high
rate of return and that profits in Japanese manufacturing are an
unusually large share of total value added. The relatively high
Japanese profit rates and profit shares, which Lawrence cites,
however, may be a statistical mirage. Relative to all other
major industrialized countries, save possibly Italy, Japan's
manufacturing sector includes disproportionate numbers of self-
employed. The profit numbers Lawrence cites include self-
employment income as part of operating surplus and therefore
overstates both the Japanese (and the Italian) rates of return.
Japanese profit rates are likely to be high relative to most
other countries not because of Japanese market power allegedly
keeping prices high and goods out, but because they include a
substantial chunk of labor income!
The Japanese Adjustment Mechanism gand the Structural
Impediments Initiative
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While I may disagree with some of the details of Lawrence's
analysis, I certainly share his conclusion that there is little
in the character of the Japanese market for manufactured goods
that prevents marginal responses to price and cost incentives.
The dramatic increase in the total volume of manufactured goods
entering Japan during the past four years, largely in response in
exchange rate changes, persuades Lawrence that there is little
necessity for an entirely new approach to trade relations with
Japan. Lawrence intends his conclusion as a rejection of the
"managed trade" approach advocated by many critics of Japan's
economic practices. Though he doesn't develop the theme, his
conclusions are also an interesting commentary on the United
States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) discussions.
The SII talks link current account adjustment with access to
the Japanese market. 1 5  This linkage reflects long-standing
thinking in the OECD and in some quarters of the U.S. Treasury
(the U.S. government agency which took the initiative in the
Spring of 1989 in proposing the SII talks) that structural
factors in many of the major industrialized economies (but
particularly Japan) prevent the exchange rate mechanism from
playing its traditional role in the international adjustment
process. SII is very useful in reassuring both the American and
Japanese electorate about the terms of foreign access to the
Japanese market. Lawrence's work reminds us, however, that the
traditional adjustment mechanisms still have a great deal of life
in them and that the empirical underpinnings of the conventional
OECD and Treasury analysis remain, at most, an open issue.
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